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Since independence, the military and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) have 
exerted unmatched influence and control over Egypt. However, an “alternative 
current” is on the rise. In this paper, first, I survey the role played by the  military 
and the MB. Second, I highlight one of the voices of this alternative current, 
Abdul Rahman Yusuf. The evolution of his thought in post-July 2013 coup era 
unveils the difficulties facing this alternative current in competing with the well-
entrenched voices of both the military and the MB. Notwithstanding such 
challenges, I argue that suggesting the existence and eventual resilience and 
popularity of an alternative current that politically and intellectually defies both 
the military and the MB in Egypt is not a far-fetched aspiration should the leaders 
of this current articulate their ideas with clarity, embrace genuine reform, 
celebrate diversity and difference as prerequisites for constructive societal and 
political pluralism. 
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The January-February 2011 and June-July 2013 events that took place in 
Egypt have been described in a variety of ways. Revolution, uprising, and the 
Arab Spring are but a few examples. However, the genuine popular contestation 
that commenced on January 25, 2011, did not translate into a full-blown 
revolution for three simple reasons: the unchanging stature of the ubiquitous 
Egyptian military, the initially powerful yet subsequently disorganized youth-led 
contestation, and the rise of the well-organized Muslim Brotherhood (MB) who 
formed an invincible alternative to all other opposition groups, especially the 
decentralized youth factions.1 While contemporary Egypt has been conventionally 
situated under the influence of either the military or the MB, it is witnessing the 
rise of an alternative current that is neither military- nor MB-affiliated. After 
presenting the military-MB dynamic, I examine the ideas of one of the intellectual 
voices of this current, Abdul Rahman Yusuf. By analyzing the evolution of 
Yusuf’s thought in the immediate post-July 2013 coup era (July-November 2013), 
I highlight the difficulty this alternative current faces in articulating its position 
amidst the competing voices of both the military and the MB. Notwithstanding 
such challenges, I argue that the existence and popularity of an alternative current 
that politically and intellectually defies both the military and the MB in Egypt is 
not a far-fetched aspiration granted that leading representatives of this current 
clearly articulate their ideological affiliation, reform program, shun differences, 
and innovatively work together. 
 
Egypt Between the Military and the Muslim Brotherhood  
 
Former President Mubarak resigned on February 11, 2011, after losing the 
support of military leaders, represented by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces 
(SCAF), in record eighteen days. As a sign of its immense power, Mubarak did 
not transfer his authorities to his newly appointed vice president, Omar Suleiman, 
but handed power to SCAF.2 A product of the military, Mubarak was forced to 
return power to the institution that granted it to him, the military, after he lost the 
support of some of its key leaders. While the military has held power since 1952, 
SCAF has been the custodian of power since February 11, 2011.  The military did 
not obstruct the unfolding of free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections 
                                                             
1 Jonathan Guyer recognizes the role of the military too: “Hosni Mubarak was removed from 
power by the combination of a mass uprising and a military coup.” While Guyer characterizes the 
2011 events as a coup-uprising combination, I frame it as a coup only since the military hijacked 
the mass uprising and co-opted revolutionary demands. See Jonathan Guyer, “Under Morsi, Red 
Lines Gone Grey,” http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/14293/under-morsi-red-lines-gone-
grAbdul Rahman Yusuf (accessed November 13, 2013).  
2 For the full speech transcript, see CBS News, “Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak Resigns,” 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/egyptian-president-hosni-mubarak-resigns/  (accessed November 
13, 2013).  
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in 2012. However, it undermined the results of both elections. It issued executive 
decrees that restricted the president’s authority, reverted to courts that annulled 
the MB-dominated parliament, and finally executed a complete military takeover 
in July 2013.3    
 
The recent Egyptian scene has been marred by coups. The current period may 
be viewed in the future as a prelude to a future revolution after protesters are able 
to overcome the twin hurdles of the military and the “deep state.”4 Only time will 
tell what path Egyptians will take and how that will reshape Egypt’s political 
narrative.  
 
The second coup in Egypt’s contemporary period, the July 3, 2013 military 
coup, temporarily halted the MB’s public political foray in the post-Mubarak era.5  
The MB appeared invincible after it formed and registered a political party in 
2011, seized the majority of parliamentary seats in 2011-12, won the presidency 
of Egypt in 2012, and gained legal NGO status in early 2013.6 However, two 
factors impeded these gains. First, the supremacy of the military certainly 
restricted the MB and any other political player who would be in the MB’s 
position. Second, none of the MB electoral victories were landslides by any 
measure. The extreme polarization that characterized Egyptian politics, and 
citizens by extension, did not dissipate. Rather, it ran throughout Muhammad 
Morsi’s year of rule and continued after the military takeover. Many Egyptians 
are split between remnants of the previous regime, or al-fulul, and the MB, or al-
Ikhwan. Many voices are lamenting the return of military rule as much as there 
were voices that lamented MB’s domination of the Egyptian political scene.  
                                                             
3 For more analysis on the role of the military in Egypt, see Sarah Salem, “The Egyptian Military 
and the 2011 Revolution,” http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/14023/the-egyptian-military-
and-the-2011-revolution (accessed November 13, 2013).  
4 The “deep state” is a concept that denotes the existence of a state within the state. It refers to the 
existence of a powerful group of individuals whose power equals, if not exceeds, that of the formal 
state apparatus. In the Egyptian context, it refers to all those civil servants, interest groups, and 
members of state bureaucracies who are vested in the military establishment due to the benefits 
they accrue. 
5 Sherif Mohy Eddin charts the differing compositions of appointed councils during the Morsi and 
Sisi eras. See his “I`adat tashkil al-nukhba ba`ad thalatha yulyu fi masr [The Remaking of Elites 
after July 3rd in Egypt],” 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/14196/%D8%A5%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-
%D8%AA%D8%B4%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%84-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-3-
%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88-%D9%81%D9%8A-
%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1 (accessed November 13, 2013).     
6 Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, 248-9 & Gamaleddine, “Breaking: Court Bans Egyptian 
MB,” http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/82304.aspx (accessed September 23, 2013).   
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The Implications of the Second Military Coup and the Fall of the MB 
 
Amidst this extreme polarization, a growing new voice that is neither MB- nor 
military-affiliated has emerged. I call it the alternative current. Thanks to the 
events of the last four years, the recent and blatant military takeover is 
encouraging the rise of this alternative current that experienced the worst of both 
groups. During the lead-up to the June 30, 2013 protests, many voiced their 
aggravations with the MB and its failures. While the MB may have exhibited a 
perturbed and inflexible attitude at times, its failures are also due to its 
inexperience in managing a country.7 It is too early and rather immature to judge 
these failures as solely MB-borne. It could very well be that these accusations 
were exaggerated, expectations were high, post-coup environment was difficult to 
manage, Egypt’s problems were mostly inherited from the Mubarak era, and the 
military and deep state did not make it any easier for Morsi and his government to 
achieve significant landmarks in the short span of time that was allotted to them.8   
 
Regardless of the reasons behind siding with one camp over another, the 
recent military takeover should be seen as an advantageous step towards the long-
term fulfillment of the Egyptian peoples’ aspirations for freedom, social justice, 
and economic prosperity. While this is a controversial argument, average 
Egyptians need to experience both modes of governance, Islamist and military, in 
a post-Mubarak era at a span of time short enough that it would allow them to 
effectively compare the merits and disadvantages of each regime. The military 
was always a power to reckon with throughout the post-Mubarak era. However, 
the military exercised self-restricted rule in 2011-2012 before giving the MB 
some space in 2012-2013. Since July 2013, the military has engaged in a public 
reassertion of power, first through an interim figurehead president and, second, 
through the rule of President Sisi. It may seem that the current period is a return to 
                                                             
7 Karim el-Gawhary surveys Islamists’ reflections on the MB’s performance while in power and 
the lessons they deduce from this experience. See “Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Limited 
Options,” http://en.qantara.de/content/muslim-brotherhood-in-egypt-limited-options (accessed 
November 15, 2013). Another interesting MB-related development concerns the overtures by the 
MB-friendly National Alliance for Supporting Legitimacy. See Wael Nawara, “The Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Bankrupt ‘Strategic’ Vision,” http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/11/muslim-brotherhood-egypt-initiative-
constitution.html?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=8604 (accessed November 
26, 2013). 
8 For an analysis of Morsi’s year in power, see Amani al-Tawil, “Ma`arakat hukm al-masriyyin 
bayn al-jaysh wa-‘l-ikhwan [The Battle over Governing Egyptians between the Military and the 
MB],” http://www.dohainstitute.org/release/0b5d0cf6-8337-4d28-91a6-8aa2035dcb79 (accessed 
November 15, 2013). 
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the ultra-nationalistic Nasserist phase with the unswerving popularity of Col. 
General Sisi.9 But this is simply not the case, given the various transformations 
that Egyptian society has undergone since Nasser’s time, the evolution of a 
stronger civil society, and the further globalization and connectivity of Egypt and 
the world as a whole with the advent of advanced information infrastructure and 
digital media.   
 
Furthermore, there has been a parallel, albeit smaller, growing trend of 
criticizing the military for its encroachment on the ideals of the January 2011 
‘revolution’. 10  By being able to criticize the two strongest players in 
contemporary Egyptian politics, the military and the MB, after the 2011 and 2013 
coups, Egyptians will help pave the way for alternative players on Egypt’s 
political scene that could eventually be serious contenders to the MB and the 
military.11      
 
An Alternative Current – Methodology & Gramscian Intellectualism 
 
To demonstrate an example of post-June 30 discourse evolution, I map out the 
changing discourse of a controversial figure, Abdul Rahman Yusuf, the son of the 
more controversial Shaikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi.12 I argue that Egypt is not destined 
to an either-or formula that fatally places it at the ruling whim of the military or 
the MB by surveying one of the spokesmen for an alternative current in Egypt’s 
                                                             
9 In the name of nationalism, some liberal groups forsake their principles and allied with the 
military to avoid a continued MB presidency. Renowned novelist, Sonallah Ibrahim, is one 
example. See Lindsey Ursula, “A Voice of Dissent Joins the Nationalist Chorus,” 
http://madamasr.com/content/voice-dissent-joins-nationalist-chorus (accessed November 13, 
2013). 
10 More Egyptians are now protesting against both the military and the MB, such as the November 
19, 2013 protest on the anniversary of Mohammad Mahmood St. events. See “Tadhahurat 
munahidha li-‘-jaysh wa’l-ikhwan [Protests against the Military and the MB],” 
http://www.ademocracynet.com/Arabic/index.php?page=news&action=Detail&id=10654 
(accessed November 26, 2013). 
11 An example of such groups is the “Revolution Path Front,” who specifically states its anti-MB, 
anti-military disposition. Some of the founding members of the April 6 Movement launched this 
front. See “New Anti-Brotherhood, Anti-Military Front Launched,” 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/14297/new-anti-brotherhood-anti-military-front-launched- 
(accessed November 13, 2013).    
12 Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926) is a prolific Islamic scholar and mufti who authored more than one 
hundred and twenty works, such as al-Halal wa-‘l haram fi-‘l-islam [The Permissible and 
Prohibited in Islam]. He is also an activist who set up different Islamic centers worldwide. 
Schooled in Egypt’s al-Azhar, Qaradawi moved to Qatar and gained its citizenship after being 
harassed in Egypt in the 1940s-61 due to his involvement with the MB. Qaradawi attracts a large 
following and is considered one of the leading Muslims religious scholars [ulama] of the 
contemporary era. 
5
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political-intellectual scene. Through examining Abdul Rahman Yusuf’s debate 
with his Islamist father, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, on the one hand and the supporters of 
the military on the other, I show that the evolution of this alternative current is not 
an easy process. It is marred by mixed feelings, contradictions, and confusion.  
The surveyed texts show how difficult it is to carve an independent course amidst 
a polarized society. I recognize that Abdul Rahman Yusuf’s writings are neither 
representative of all Egyptians nor representative of a growing alternative current 
per se. Other public intellectuals, politicians, and media figures, who are part of 
this non-MB, non-military alternative current, such as Belal Fadl, Bassem 
Youssef, Hani Shukrallah, Wael Kandil, and Emad Shahin are equally, if not 
more, influential.13   
 
In my categorization of Abdul Rahman Yusuf as an intellectual, I 
simultaneously adopt and challenge Antonio Gramsci’s conceptualization of 
intellectuals. Gramsci recognizes the ability of people to produce ideas in general, 
but only those that should be recognized as intellectuals are those whose social 
function is determined by the ideas they acquire, develop, and reproduce.  
According to Gramsci, one can only categorize individuals as intellectuals when 
their ideas actually influence their course of action. Gramsci expands the notion 
of intellectuals to not only include thinkers and writers, but other professionals as 
well, such as “scientists, theorists…philosophers,” as long as they fulfill an 
independent, critical thinking component.14 In this sense, Yusuf and the other 
identified members of the group readily qualify as intellectuals given the quality 
of their thought and its popularity among people.15  
                                                             
13 For more background and link to their works, see https://twitter.com/belalfadl  
https://twitter.com/emadshahin, https://twitter.com/hanishukrallah, 
https://twitter.com/drbassemyoussef, https://twitter.com/waiel65. This group of intellectuals is 
united in its aversion to any form of hegemony, whether that perpetrated by the military or the 
MB.  However, each one expresses his sentiments differently. Emad Shahin, by far, is the most 
vocal critic. This has led to his self-imposed exile after the government-military establishment 
brought forth a lawsuit against him while he was abroad for a conference engagement.  As a result 
of this case, Shahin was sentenced to death in absentia in May 2015. Both Fadl and Youssef are 
also under self-imposed exile in the US. Youssef is well known for his attacks of the MB during 
their rule and of the military after their takeover. However, he was forced to stop his show twice, 
at CBC and MBC channels, after pressures from the Egyptian government. Youssef remains 
critical, but does not voice his critique against the military in a publicly sharp tone, as he 
previously did.  
14 Gramsci Reader, 302. 
15 Some of the already-mentioned intellectuals have a following in the hundreds of thousands or in 
the millions. Many of their articles are cross-posted on social media sites and attract numerous 
comments. As to Yusuf, his website, www.arahman.net, is similarly popular and has attracted over 
16million+ visitors as of May 2014. This number was at the bottom of the website’s main page, 
but the number is no longer shown on the website. Information remains incomplete, though, as the 
website’s age is unknown. Sixteen million reflects the number of views or hits. The time it took to 
6
Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Multidisciplinary Studies, Vol. 4 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://ir.uiowa.edu/mathal/vol4/iss1/6
DOI: 10.17077/2168-538X.1066
7 
 
However, Gramsci stresses that all intellectuals protect and represent the 
interests of their social group and are coopted by the “dominant social group,” or 
the state, becoming the “deputies” of the state in its application of hegemony. In 
the case of Abdul Rahman Yusuf, he and other members of this alternative current 
fit into Gramsci’s expanded definition of intellectuals by presenting critical 
thought and trying to represent the politically subaltern, but they have not been 
coopted by either the military or the MB regimes in Egypt. As such, Yusuf and 
his cohort challenge Gramsci’s characterization of intellectuals as the mouthpiece 
of a dominant order. It remains to be seen whether the state’s methods of 
cooptation or repression succeed in silencing the members of this alternative 
current, putting it in further alignment with Gramsci’s standpoint on intellectuals. 
 
 I translate and analyze two of Abdul Rahman Yusuf’s articles.16 Yusuf wrote 
the first surveyed article four days after the July 3, 2013 military coup and in 
response to his father’s pro-Morsi fatwa [legal opinion]. Abdul Rahman Yusuf 
wrote the second highlighted article on November 23, 2013 denoting a shift in his 
priorities. In both articles, he discusses Egypt, the role of Islam, the MB, and the 
military. I first present a brief biography of Abdul Rahman Yusuf, analyze the 
main ideas in his texts and compare the content of his articles, accentuating 
Yusuf’s stance and changing mood. I conclude by defining the contours of an 
alternative current and the challenges it faces based on the evolution of Yusuf’s 
thought. 
 
Abdul Rahman Yusuf – Like Father, Like Son? 
 
Abdul Rahman Yusuf does not use al-Qaradawi for a surname. Given the 
immediate recognition the surname attracts, Abdul Rahman Yusuf probably does 
not want to be readily associated with his father in the public arena. In stark 
contrast to his father’s traditional dress and beard, Abdul Rahman Yusuf dons 
modern clothes and has no facial hair. Unlike his father’s Islamist and MB 
orientation, Abdul Rahman Yusuf is a liberal journalist and a best-selling poet.17 
                                                                                                                                                                      
reach this number of hits is unknown. It is not the number of unique visitors; therefore, various 
repeat visitors are surely part of the mix. This does not reduce the significance of this large 
number, but puts the number into a larger context. 
16 Analysis follows in the article while my full translation of both newspaper articles are in two 
appendices. 
17 To get a better sense of Abdul Rahman Yusuf’s poetry and style, see the following YouTube: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O3HP0FftRPo (accessed November 30, 2013). Abdul Rahman 
Yusuf published eleven poetry collections, some of which were reprinted several times. His first 
collection, Bleeding Letters, was published in 1992 and his latest, Shameless [`Ala ras-ha bat-ha], 
was published in 2014. See Abdul Rahman Yusuf Website, http://www.arahman.net/2012-12-31-
00-20-44 for digital images of all his poetry book covers (accessed March 22, 2015).   
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Born on September 18, 1970, Abdul Rahman Yusuf is Qaradawi’s third son.18 
Abdul Rahman Yusuf associates himself with Egypt’s youth when contrasting his 
generation to his father’s in the first surveyed newspaper article. Abdul Rahman 
Yusuf followed his father’s educational footsteps by studying shari`a during his 
undergraduate years and Maqasid al-shari`a for his masters at Cairo University’s 
Dar al-Ulum.19 However, Abdul Rahman Yusuf’s career path diverged from his 
father’s as the former pursued journalism and poetry writing, leaning towards 
political themes in his publications. The father-son divergence does not end here. 
They do not meet ideologically either. Other than their common aversion of 
Mubarak and his regime, Abdul Rahman Yusuf was a major supporter of 
Mohamed El-Baradei and a founding member of the campaign that endorsed 
Baradei’s change platform prior to the January-February 2011 coup. 20  Abdul 
Rahman Yusuf was also one of the founding members of Kifaya, a political 
opposition group founded under Mubarak’s rule. Clearly, he is not an MB 
member or sympathizer, like his father.21 This bustling, anti-regime activity and 
poetry resulted in Abdul Rahman Yusuf’s ban from both writing and presenting 
TV shows in Egypt in the 2000s.    
 
Abdul Rahman Yusuf has contributed articles to various Egyptian 
newspapers, such as al-Shorouk, al-Yawm al-Sabi`, al-Masry al-Yawm, and Arabi 
21. His shows debuted on Jazeera Documentary and the liberal Egyptian channel, 
CBC.22 Abdul Rahman Yusuf certainly picked up his father’s passion for writing, 
though in a different form and orientation. Like al-Qaradawi, Abdul Rahman 
Yusuf realizes the importance of media and has made a career out of it. Both 
father and son are celebrities, yet for different reasons and to different audiences.  
Realizing the impact of his father on both Egyptian public opinion and many of 
                                                             
18  Abdul Rahman Yusuf’s personal information comes from his personal website, 
http://www.arahman.net/2013-01-10-09-36-31 (accessed November 13, 2013). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. Mohamed El-Baradei is an Egyptian diplomat who served as the Director General of the 
International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) from 1997-2009. He received a Nobel peace 
prize in 2005 jointly with IAEA for his efforts at curbing the threat of atomic energy. Upon his 
retirement, he returned to Egypt and turned to politics by pushing for change prior to the 2011 
events. He has a large following among the non-MB, non-military masses. However, he lost some 
credibility after joining the government that followed the July 2013 coup as vice president for one 
month before his resignation after the Rabi`a attacks against MB followers. He now resides in 
Vienna, Austria and has stayed away from Egyptian politics with the exception of posting a few 
political opinion-editorials. 
21 There were rumors that Abdul Rahman Yusuf converted to Shiism in 2008, an act that Abdul 
Rahman Yusuf publicly denied. For more details, see “I Did Not Convert: Son of Egyptian Sunni 
Preacher,” http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/10/15/58297.html (accessed December 5, 2013). 
22  Abdul Rahman Yusuf Personal Website, http://www.arahman.net/2013-01-10-09-36-31 
(accessed November 13, 2013).  
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the religiously observant, Abdul Rahman Yusuf attacks the MB in an emotionally 
charged article in response to his father’s pro-Morsi fatwa. He defends his ideals 
and convictions in a July 7, 2013 response article, giving readers a rare glimpse of 
the well-known father and son, a religious scholar versus a liberal poet, in a public 
battle over the hearts and minds of Egyptians. Less than four months later and in 
the second surveyed article, Yusuf drops his diatribe against the MB, shifts 
directions, and concentrates his criticism on the military instead. 
 
From Anti-MB to Anti-Military: The Evolution of Yusuf’s Thought 
 
Abdul Rahman Yusuf displays a respectful and affectionate tone towards his 
father in the first surveyed article, unlike the second, more charged article against 
members of the pro-military, ultra-nationalist wave. The personal letter to 
Qaradawi contains criticisms against Morsi and the MB, but it is not the sole 
purpose of the article, as is the case with the second, more focused article on 
Abdul Rahman Yusuf’s detractors. Second, we learn intimate details about the 
father-son relationship in the first article that would not be known otherwise. For 
instance, Abdul Rahman Yusuf refers to his father’s “liberal” upbringing of his 
children that focused on cultivating independent judgment and the pursuit and 
preservation of freedom. We also find a loving son finding excuses for the father 
while criticizing his fatwa by blaming it on the father’s generation lack of 
understanding, the complications of the situation, and Qaradawi’s busy schedule: 
 
My virtuous, great father: I am your student before being your son. It appears 
to me and to many of your disciples and students that the current moment, in 
all its complications and confusions, is wholly novel and different from the 
experience of your whole generation. Your generation did not know real, 
popular revolutions and was not close to the will of the people and the 
uncommon thinking of youth. Because of this probable reason, what you 
have recently written does not reflect what your graciousness taught me or 
what you raised me up on.  
 
Abdul Rahman Yusuf lists unconvincing reasons. Many members of his 
father’s generation stood against Morsi and many have busy schedules, too.  
Furthermore, they were not as “patient” as Abdul Rahman Yusuf paints them.  
Many of his father’s generation attempted revolting against the regime several 
times, but were crushed by President Nasser and faced imprisonment, death, or 
exile. Although he is forty-five years old, Yusuf conflates his generation with the 
protesting youth of 2011. Yusuf and his generation by extension lived all their 
lives under military rule and were not able to effect any change. The younger 
protesters, on the other hand, forcefully and successfully pushed for change in 
9
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2011 only when the military, which was equally surprised by the popular protests, 
did not block the uprising against Mubarak.   
 
Beyond his employment of the generational divide argument, Yusuf is trying 
to rationalize his father’s position while ensuring that both his father and the 
public accept his newspaper article. He frames his letter in this tone because he 
clearly loves and respects his father. Writing the article in this manner serves his 
project as well. In line with Egyptian and Muslim culture’s utmost respect for 
parents, average Egyptians would not approve a son’s public critique of his father, 
especially when the father is one of the major religious figures of contemporary 
times.   
 
Third, Yusuf uses religion to respond back to his father’s fatwa. Raised in a 
religious household and educated in shari`a, he is more than capable of defending 
his anti-MB stance by countering his father’s religious arguments. Here, Yusuf 
quotes some of his father’s previous works and refers to private lessons he 
received from his father that go against the fatwa’s content:   
 
You told my whole generation and told me: “freedom before shari`a!”23 With 
these words, I was and continue to be one of the revolutionaries who demands 
freedom for all people. I demanded this freedom in [Tahrir] Square on January 
25th and on June 30th as well. I did not concern myself with calling for shari`a – it 
is not my duty to enforce shari`a on anyone. Rather, I was busy inciting people to 
be free.  To me, freedom and shari`a are the same. Did God not create people to 
be free? 
My great father: in your fatwa, you appealed to General Sisi, all political parties, 
and to all seekers of freedom, justice, and dignity to unite and defend 
righteousness by reinstating President Morsi to his position, advising him 
continuously, and putting forth well-guided solutions [for Egypt’s problems]. 
What if I tell you, sir, they have been doing that for a whole year, and the man 
did not respond. 
 
Fourth, Yusuf presents his case against Morsi and the MB while criticizing his 
father’s pro-Morsi stance. He lists all the promises made and breached by Morsi. 
He also accuses Morsi of various mistakes, such as imprisoning critics and blindly 
obeying the MB, without providing any evidence proving that Morsi committed 
these acts. Exemplifying the emotional anti-MB stance held by several of Yusuf’s 
liberal, upper-middle class cohort right after June 30, 2013 and during the time of 
                                                             
23 This echoes a similar statement given by Kuwaiti MB leader, Tareq al-Suwaidan. Suwaidan’s 
statement elicited sharp, critical responses in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states. 
Qaradawi presented the idea before Suwaidan introduced it in a 2012 conference held in Kuwait.  
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writing this article, Yusuf frames Morsi as a prisoner of the murshid [supreme 
leader] and the MB without, again, any evidence.    
 
Fifth, in the boldest critique of his father, Abdul Rahman Yusuf frowns upon 
Qaradawi’s form of intervention. Qaradawi did not issue an opinion. He released 
a fatwa. Here, Yusuf’s infuriation is the clearest with his call for the separation of 
religion and politics. Sixth, the military receives scant reference in the first text. 
Other than reassuring his father that the ‘revolution’ would not be hijacked by the 
fulul and the military, the bulk of attack is centered on the MB. By supporting the 
deposition of Morsi, Yusuf is indirectly expressing support for the military, even 
though it does not clearly appear in the text.   
 
It took Yusuf a few months to realize that the reassurances he gave to his 
father regarding the military were both naïve and premature. After the 
entrenchment of the military regime and the development of a Sisi cult, Yusuf 
shifts course and focuses his attention on ridding the ‘revolution’ from inhibiting 
forces. In a second article, Yusuf expands on a recently coined colloquial term to 
describe the group that he was once part of: al-Yunyagiyya.24 Here, he does not 
explicitly attack the military, although he is indirectly criticizing its supporters 
and many of its circles. The Yunyagiyya are portrayed as pro-military and anti-
MB who are not necessarily part of the old regime, the fulul, but have voluntarily 
moved from their anti-MB stance to a pro-military one: 
 
Who are al-Yunyagiyya? They are, in sum, a group of Egyptians who took to the 
streets on June 30, 2013; [a group] who supported what happened on July 3rd and 
[who supported] the bloodshed that took place afterwards. They have distinctive 
features. [One] of these features is their belief that God gave them the right to 
speak on behalf of those that descended to the streets [protested] that day; that is, 
[speaking on behalf of] over forty million persons (according to them).25 
 
Like Baradei, Yusuf loathes all of those who adopt MB-like exclusionary 
tactics and laments the loss of Egypt to the MB or military circles. Noting the 
restricted freedoms that unfolded after the July coup, Yusuf indirectly comments 
on the closure of TV channels towards the end of his article. He retracts from his 
earlier letter by stating that his actions are based on his love of Egypt and not 
                                                             
24 The colloquial Egyptian term Yunyagiyya was, most probably, not coined by Yusuf. It seems 
that it developed organically after the June protests. Appearing on various social networking sites, 
the term is becoming more popular. But the term refers to supporters of the June coup in general, 
and does not necessarily adopt the features that Yusuf holds for Yunyagiyya in his article. 
25  The author inserts both the parenthesis and the words within the parenthesis. I insert any 
additional words in brackets to smoothen the translation. 
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“hatred [for] al-Ikhwan.” Gone are the virulent attacks against the MB. They are 
now replaced with an attack on al-Yunyagiyya and their actions: 
 
Another feature of al-Yunyagiyya: they hate Islamists and [Muslim] Brothers 
more than they loathe tyranny. They do not mind supporting tyrants in their 
oppression of the Egyptian people as long as the tanks [of the tyrants] crush the 
Islamists. For the sake of that [excluding Islamists], they [al-Yunyagiyya] commit 
the same mistakes committed by al-Ikhwan when the [latter] were in power. But 
theirs [Yunyagiyya’s mistakes] are exponentially multiplied [when compared to 
MB mistakes]. 
 
Another noticeable feature is the presence of socialist motifs unfound in the 
previous text. Yusuf absolves himself from any association with al-Yunyagiyya 
and their luxurious lifestyle by announcing that he is a real protestor: one that 
does not eat “smoked salmon… and kabob” while protesting. He frames the 
revolution as the revolution of the poor who are pitted against the “rich… 
Yunyagiyya.”   
 
While written in a cynical and highly critical tone, the article ends on a less 
negative, prophesying note: the Yunyagiyya will eventually wake up and act in the 
country’s best interest. Yusuf goes more extreme and public in his attack of the 
military in another article published on November 30, 2013, “Are You a 
Revolutionary or Are You Sawsan?” Due to its biting criticism of the military, the 
article was not cleared for publication by al-Shorouk. Yusuf published it on his 
website instead.26 
 
The Contours & Challenges of the Alternative Current 
 
Through a brief snapshot of a few newspaper articles, Abdul Rahman Yusuf 
offers readers and spectators a microcosm of the issues, methodology, and 
structural weaknesses and opportunities facing a rising alternative political-
intellectual current in Egypt. The non-MB, non-military current, as viewed solely 
through the focused lens of Abdul Rahman Yusuf, is not anchored in an 
                                                             
26 Abdul Rahman Yusuf Website, “Inta thawri willa Sawsan? [Are You a Revolutionary or Are 
You Sawsan?]” http://arahman.net/menu-types/1602-2013-11-30-08-17-57 (accessed December 5, 
2013). In a different article published on December 7, 2013, and titled “al-`Azil wa’l-ma`zoul [The 
Impeacher and the Impeached,]” Yusuf goes back to his anti-Morsi position and defends it while 
simultaneously attacking military action http://arahman.net/menu-types/1605-2013-12-08-06-38-
07 (accessed December 9, 2013). His articles either react to events or to his audience’s feedback. 
Yusuf also denounces Egyptian media in his latest articles. He further announces his recent move 
to a new online newspaper, Arabi 21. Yusuf’s shift to Arabi 21 is most likely a reaction to al-
Shorouk’s ban of his “Sawsan” article. See http://arabi21.com/a-2/a-299/708047-a. 
12
Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Multidisciplinary Studies, Vol. 4 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://ir.uiowa.edu/mathal/vol4/iss1/6
DOI: 10.17077/2168-538X.1066
13 
 
ideological setting; presents no clear agenda; it is reactive in nature; and simply 
lacks the unity and leadership that would allow it to compete with the dominant 
forces in Egyptian society: the military and the MB. 
 
Abdul Rahman Yusuf embodies the obscurity plaguing many members of the 
non-MB, non-military group. Yusuf’s ideological orientation is unclear. He 
presents himself as religiously oriented in one article yet socialist-leaning in 
another. It could very well be that he believes in strands of both. While this is 
certainly viable for Yusuf and any other intellectual, this ideological 
amalgamation detracts from building a support base or allowing for a larger 
following like that of the MB, for instance. Openness to ideas is a hallmark of 
liberals; however, this same openness and fluidity confuses more than it helps 
attract Egyptians in search for a consistent and clear model that comfortably pulls 
them away from an attachment to either the MB or military establishments or a 
move towards general apathy. If the alternative current aims to be liberal, what 
does liberal mean to it? What are its core beliefs? What are its non-negotiable 
traits? Starting with a clear ideological affinity and an identification of a solid 
model coupled with well-articulated definitions of and positions on basic 
concepts, such as religion, freedom, social justice, and equality will go a long way 
in bolstering a political-intellectual alternative in post-Mubarak, post-Morsi 
Egypt. 
 
Once Yusuf clarifies his ideological affinity, he needs a detailed reform 
program that engages and incites others in ways that go beyond the current 
generalities that characterize his newspaper articles under consideration. This 
program is needed the most in times of uncertainty, like the post-July 2013 coup 
environment that Yusuf is writing under. Instead, Yusuf’s discourse is reactive in 
nature, whether to the MB at the beginning or to the military in the second and 
third articles. Building an alternative current that is only reacting to the statements 
and activities of foes fulfills a limited objective. It temporarily deters the other 
camp under attack if Yusuf presents a convincing argument; however, it does not 
advance one’s own intellectual-political program. There is no need to refrain from 
criticizing other platforms. However, engaging in such activity alone without 
simultaneously and proactively holding and propagating a sustained program will 
not help build a popular base for an alternative current. 
 
The glaring lack of leadership in the non-MB, non-military camp is a major 
handicap that plagued the efforts of the youth in the immediate post-uprising era 
and continues to plague any serious contenders to the military and the MB. 
Muhammad el-Baradei, the founder of the Constitution Party, initially played this 
role. He certainly was the leader of the group that Yusuf was a member of under 
13
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both the Mubarak and the immediate post-Mubarak eras. However, Baradei has 
stepped out of the scene, resigning from the vice presidency after the military 
shootings of MB supporters in August 2013. Since then, various individuals speak 
out against both the MB and the military, but there is neither coordination nor a 
unifying vision between them.  
 
Conclusion – Toward a Stronger Foundation for an Alternative Current 
 
Egyptians are neither the hostages of the military nor the MB. While there are 
many voices who either support the military or the MB, I have shown that there 
are other voices who politically and intellectually defy both routes.  The rise and 
visibility of an alternative current in contemporary Egypt is a reality. While not 
representative of all Egyptians by any means, the writings of Abdul Rahman 
Yusuf are an important vignette into one form of public discourse on 
contemporary Egyptian political developments. Yusuf combines features found in 
both camps: religious upbringing and MB familiarity as well as a liberal outlook 
that favors the separation of religion and state. Yusuf’s familiarity with and 
experience of both the MB and military regimes allows him to revolt against both 
routes in his writings and pave the way for another alternative. Many other 
members of civil society are calling for the fulfillment of Egypt’s aspirations for 
freedom, social justice, and economic prosperity through a non-military, non-MB 
route. In order for this alternative route to take hold, Yusuf and other members of 
this cohort need to go beyond attacks of the MB and the military and express their 
ideology, philosophy, and program to be able to offer an intellectual blueprint that 
can incite a real uprising against the status quo.   
 
It will take the will of the likes of Abdul Rahman Yusuf to increase awareness 
and build strong foundations for resilient options that could stand against two 
powerful and organized entities like the Egyptian MB and the military. A firmly 
entrenched non-military, non-MB current is in the making. It has faced and will 
continue to face hurdles and challenges yet its appeal should not be 
underestimated.  
 
_______________ 
 
Appendix I – First Surveyed Newspaper Article: 
 
“Abdul Rahman Yusuf al-Qaradawi Writes – ‘Excuse me my beloved father, 
Morsi has no Legitimacy’”  
 
Sunday, July 7, 2013 
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al-Yawm al-Sabi` 27 
 
My great and virtuous father, the erudite Shaikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, 
I have known you to be an honorable scholar and an erudite jurist: a person 
who knows the secrets of shari`a, delves into and reflects upon its purposes 
(maqasid al-shari`a) and heritage. We are witnessing critical moments in 
Egypt’s history in the present time: the Egypt that you are so proud of and 
love to the extent of choos[ing as a] title for your memoirs, Ibn al-Qarya wa-
'l-Kuttab [The Son of the Village and Madrasa]. Today, I address the Egyptian 
in you that was born in the village and raised in the madrasa. 
 
My virtuous, great father: I am your student before being your son. It appears 
to me and to many of your disciples and students that the current moment, in 
all its complications and confusions, is wholly novel and different from the 
experience of your whole generation. Your generation did not know real, 
popular revolutions and was not close to the will of the people and the 
uncommon thinking of youth. Because of this probable reason, what you have 
recently written does not reflect what your graciousness taught me or what 
you raised me on.  
 
Each drop of blood of mine testifies to your knowledge and virtue, my 
precious father. You issued a fatwa yesterday ordaining the support of the 
(rightly)28 impeached President Muhammad Morsi. The fatwa states – 
 
“For the last thirty years, if not sixty years, Egyptians were deprived from 
electing their own president and from submitting to a person of their own 
choice until God empowered them, allowing [Egyptians] to freely choose 
a president.  [The people] chose President Muhammad Morsi and gave 
him an oath of allegiance and covenant to obey him in hardship and ease 
(`usr wa yusr) and in matters they either condone or support. All persons 
acquiesced [to Morsi’s authority], whether they were civilians, military 
personnel, or rulers and ruled. Among those who consented [to Morsi] was 
                                                             
27 For the original Arabic text, see Abdul Rahman Yusuf, “Abdul Rahman Yusuf al-Qaradawi 
yaktub – `afwan abi al-habib, Morsi la shari`yya lahu [Abdul Rahman Yusuf al-Qaradawi Writes 
– ‘Excuse me my beloved father, Morsi has no legitimacy],” 
http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1152641#.Upy9LWthiSP (accessed November 03, 
2013). 
 
28 This is the author’s word and parenthesis. At other instances, I will include the original Arabic 
in parenthesis if the translation does not convey the original text’s complete spirit. Words in 
brackets are my own. 
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Colonel General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who was Defense Minister in [PM] 
Hisham Qandil’s government. He [Sisi] took an oath and solemnly 
pledged allegiance, vowing to adhere [to] and obey President Morsi (al-
sam` wa-'l-ta’a` ). He remained loyal to his oath until we saw him 
suddenly change and transform himself from a mere minister to becoming 
the upholder of ultimate power. He justified deposing his legitimate 
president by repealing his oath and siding with one group of citizens 
against another group, claiming that he is with the numerically superior 
side.” 
 
My dear father, the comparison between Morsi and Mubarak is unacceptable. 
This is our generation’s view, which is not understood by previous 
generations probably. My sir, our generation did not endure despotism for 
sixty or thirty years as you stated. Rather, it is your generation that [endured 
despotism] in the name of patience. As to us, we are a generation that learned 
to prevent the seeds of despotism from flourishing on Earth. This is why we 
decided to uproot despotism in its first year before it grows because it is a 
malicious tree that needs to be uprooted. 
 
If Morsi committed one percent of his predecessors’ actions, we would not 
remain quiet. This is our right. We will not fall into the trap of comparison to 
the past sixty years. I learned from you that Muslims must abide by their 
stipulations [the rules they set upon themselves]. Didn’t you say,  
“If the leader (imam) agreed to abide by the majority opinion and was 
given an oath of allegiance on that basis, he must legally abide by what he 
committed to. It is not permissible for him to negate this condition after 
assuming power and declare that consultation (shura) is optional and not 
binding on him. Let him [the leader] think whatever he wants; but if he 
was chosen by the elites [of society] (ahl al-hall wa-‘l `aqd) on a 
condition, then he has no choice but to abide by it and execute its terms.29 
Muslims must abide by the conditions set upon them. Loyalty to one’s 
covenant is a duty, and it is part of the believers’ ethics. Hence, (and the 
words are still yours [father]) we believe that even if a group of people 
disagrees over the compulsory nature of shura, people can still enforce it 
                                                             
29 Ahl al-hall wa-‘l-` aqd, literally translated to ‘those that loosen and bind,’ is a diverse group that 
tends to be comprised of the elites of society, such as the `ulama (religion), merchants (trade), and 
tribal heads. The ruler who would consult them on major decisions enables their decision-making 
capacity. This informal consultation process endows the decision with legitimacy and is a form of 
symbolic representation, since it assumes that each group speaks on behalf of its larger 
constituency. There is no singular definition or uniform application of the concept. It is, rather, 
fluid and adaptive to the context.   
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upon the guardian if they stipulated so when contracting him into his 
position of leadership. He must abide by shura and its results and he needs 
to adopt the opinion of the majority, whether it is an absolute [majority] or 
[a] restricted one. On this basis, differences cease” (Quoted from Public 
Policy in accordance with the Shari`a (siyasa shari`yya) in Light of Sharia 
& its Purposes, page 116, Wahba Publishers).30      
My gracious and great father, we gave an oath of allegiance to the man 
[Morsi], and he promised us [that he would reach] consensus [with all 
political groups when drafting] the constitution, but he did not fulfill [his 
promise]. He also promised consensus when forming the government, but he 
did not fulfill [his promise]. He promised that people would participate in 
governing the country and not rule it single-handedly. He did not fulfill his 
promise. He pledged to be a president for all Egyptians, and he did not fulfill 
his promise. More important than all of that is our oath to him to serve as the 
Egyptian president of the revolution. Instead, he declares, when addressing the 
police corps on the anniversary of the revolution, that “you are the heart of the 
January revolution!!!” He promised to purify the police corps, and he did not 
fulfill that promise either. Based on which of these [unfulfilled] promises do 
you want us to uphold him [as our president given his negation of all his oaths 
to us]? 
 
He reconciled with the deep state, the remnants [of the past regime: fulul], 
Mubarak’s businessmen, and with all underlying evils of bygone eras. He 
even tried to enlist all of these groups to his service and bring them closer to 
his jama`a. He aided the unjust ones with their injustices, leading God to 
empower them against him. 
 
My father and teacher: I memorize a statement you taught me which I will 
never forget as long as I live. It surpasses all statements. This statement has 
become my sacrosanct principle and guided me in understanding both Islam 
and public policy. You told my whole generation and told me: “freedom 
before shari`a!”31  With these words, I was and continue to be one of the 
revolutionaries who demands freedom for all people. I demanded this freedom 
in [Tahrir] Square on January 25th and on June 30th as well. I did not concern 
myself with calling for shari`a – it is not my duty to enforce shari`a on 
                                                             
30  There is no agreed-upon translation of siyasa shari`yya. I translate it as public policy in 
accordance with shari`a, but I also like Baber Johansen’s translation of the term, “political 
function of the sacred law.” 
31 This echoes a similar statement given by Kuwaiti MB leader, Tareq al-Suwaidan. Suwaidan’s 
statement elicited sharp, critical responses in the GCC. Qaradawi presented the idea before 
Suwaidan introduced it in a 2012 conference held in Kuwait.  
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anyone. Rather, I was busy inciting people to be free. To me, freedom and 
shari`a are the same. Did God not create people to be free? 
 
My great father: in your fatwa, you appealed to General Sisi, all political 
parties, and to all seekers of freedom, justice, and dignity to unite and defend 
righteousness by reinstating President Morsi to his position, advising him 
continuously, and putting forth well-guided solutions [for Egypt’s problems]. 
What if I tell you, sir, they have been doing that for a whole year, and the man 
did not respond! 
 
What if I tell you, my teacher, that some of his own advisors, whom he chose 
himself and whom we trust and [who] are known for their knowledge, 
religiosity, loyalty, and nationalism, have all left him after discovering that 
they were nothing more than democratic décor and a façade covering up for a 
new despotism. The man was not listening to anyone, except his jama`a and 
Supreme Guide (murshid). The MB and its murshid were never honest 
advisors or virtuous supporters. Instead, they supported him in what did not 
lead to the betterment of Egypt, whether in spiritual or worldly affairs. They 
pushed him into a confrontation with the people by [Morsi] siding with the 
MB over [the people] and by justifying and passing his decisions unilaterally, 
leading to much bloodshed and sedition. Egyptians and revolutionaries did not 
pay Morsi an oath of allegiance for all of this. 
 
My sir and the ‘crown of my head’ (taj rasi) [denoting utmost respect to his 
father], what if I tell you that I myself participated in various efforts for 
reconciliation [between the President and the opposition before the June 30 
demonstrations], but the president, his supporters and clan (`ashira) proudly 
rebuffed our gestures.32 We met with all parties during [those] hard times. No 
one doubted the legitimacy of the president back then. Reconciliation was 
possible with simple concessions [from Morsi], but unfortunately there were 
no responsible statesmen. We were confronted with a group of greedy men 
intent on domination, regardless of the consequences.  
 
We all wished that the president completed his term and [wished] for the 
success of the first elected civilian president experiment. But he insisted on 
delegitimizing himself by himself! He did that by blindly following those who 
controlled him and for his allegiance to those who have no legitimacy or an 
oath of allegiance or a covenant [with the Egyptian people, such as the 
murshid]. These same people are now emotionally blackmailing their 
                                                             
32 He is mocking Morsi’s use of `ashira when addressing the Egyptian people instead of using 
citizens. 
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followers and prominent figures into falling for blasphemy by calling for the 
protection of legitimacy and shari`a! 
 
The reality of what happened in Egypt in the past year is that the Muslim 
Brotherhood treated the Egyptian presidency as a division within the jama`a. 
We paid and will continue to pay the price of this action with spilled blood 
and malice between the sons of our one country! 
 
My teacher and sir, I respect every word you have written. I know your good 
intentions. However, my reservation is that your opinion was not a political 
one that could either be right or wrong: an opinion written by the “citizen” 
Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, the son of the village and kuttab. Rather, it was a legal 
fatwa provided by the wasatiyya imam “shaikh”33 Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. I am 
hurt, confused, and amazed by this [fatwa].   
 
The time has come for this umma to undergo the arduous path and draw the 
boundaries between that which is religious and that which is political, so we 
know when it is time for jurists to speak and when it is time for politicians to 
speak! 
 
In conclusion, I am the one person who knows you the most in this world, and 
[I know] that you would not sell your religion for worldly affairs. You are 
keener on upholding righteousness and justice than upholding a sect or 
ideology. The details of all the events we went through are plenty and too 
complicated, and you are busy with your grand scholarly endeavors. I know, 
father, that your fatwa came in defense of the right of Egyptians to freely 
choose who represents them without reverting back to the domination of 
military rule. We will never allow the military to rule us again. My comments 
are a token of gratitude to you and a thankful testimony to your beautiful 
knowledge that you bestowed upon me. 
 
Believe me, my gracious, patient father. If we apply what you wrote in your 
books on the community and the state (al-umma wa-‘l-dawla), the 
jurisprudence of priorities, the jurisprudence of reality, the jurisprudence of 
the purposes of shari`a, and [on] freedom that comes before shari`a, as you 
taught us, then you would be the first to call for revolting against the unjust 
[person] who betrayed his covenant, leaked state secrets, and imprisoned his 
opponents for supposedly defaming him. He [Morsi] left [his opponents with] 
                                                             
33 These are the author’s quotation marks on both citizen and shaikh. 
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the [same level of] freedoms that Mubarak left them with [by stating]: “say 
what you want and I will do what I want.”      
 
My great father: there are hundreds of thousands of pure and loyal youth in 
Rabia al-`Adawiyya Square. They are a powerful national force that will be 
misused by a group of lowly stakeholders and merchants of blood by pitting 
them against other Egyptians in a losing battle that is neither national nor 
Islamic in nature. It is not even a battle against an enemy, and it is certainly 
not a battle that will emerge with a victor. All who enter this battle will lose. 
Millions of loyal souls will be facing a doomed destiny as a price for the greed 
of a few persons who are seeking more power and domination. We are in such 
a dire need for rational words that contain truth [and] that preserve pure blood 
from wastefully spilling. 
 
The popular will of June 30 is nothing but an extension of [the] January 25 
[revolution]. If some of the past regime remnants (fulul) thought that what 
happened [on June 30] is a prelude to their return [to power], then I tell your 
grace, in all confidence, they are dreaming. This exceptional generation will 
stand firm against any unjust person and will never let its revolution slip away 
until it reaches its goals. They will stand firm against any unjust person, 
whether he is wearing a helmet [denoting the military], a hat [denoting 
foreigners], or a turban [denoting `ulama and/or the MB]. 
 
My beloved father, you raised us, your sons, on freedom and independent 
thinking.  I am proud of you as much as you are proud of us and beyond. I 
know that this article will push some individuals to castigate me with 
disobedience [and ingratitude towards you]. But I could not remain silent over 
what you stated as a fatwa and not as an opinion. You accustomed us to being 
free and independent. You warned us repeatedly against blind imitation, 
following others without evidence, and for [aimlessly] trailing behind leaders 
and symbols [of power]. You taught us to proclaim the word of truth, even if 
it goes against our parents, our relatives, and us. You taught us to know [the 
true quality of] men through their commitment to truth and not know the truth 
through [uncritically accepting what is claimed as truth from] men. 
 
Our family deserves to be proud of not raising distorted copies of one another. 
Our family produced independent figures, unlike many other families that 
claim to be liberal and free, yet we only see carbon copies [of liberal family 
members] without differences. 
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My great father: these words are some of what you instilled in us. It is 
originally your ideas and words and some of your grace and jurisprudence. It 
is your precious merchandise returning to you.34      
  
And God is behind all purposes. Long live Egypt for Egyptians and with 
Egyptians. 
 
 
_____________ 
 
 
Appendix II – Second Surveyed Newspaper Article: 
 
“Al-Yunyagiyya”35 
al-Shorouk, November 23, 2013 
 
Who are al-Yunyagiyya? They are, in sum, a group of Egyptians who took to 
the streets on June 30, 2013; [a group] who supported what happened on July 
3rd and [who supported] the bloodshed that took place afterwards. They have 
distinctive features. [One] of these features is their belief that God gave them 
the right to speak on behalf of those that descended to the streets [protested] 
that day; that is, [speaking on behalf of] over forty million persons (according 
to them).36 
 
Another feature of al-Yunyagiyya: they hate Islamists and [Muslim] Brothers 
more than they loathe tyranny. They do not mind supporting tyrants in their 
oppression of the Egyptian people as long as the tanks [of the tyrants] crush 
                                                             
34 This phrase recalls a Quranic verse, Q12:65, that presents another narrative of a father and a 
son, Jacob and Joseph, and uses the same terminology: “And when they opened their baggage, 
they found their merchandise returned to them. They said, "O our father, what [more] could we 
desire? This is our merchandise returned to us. And we will obtain supplies for our family and 
protect our brother and obtain an increase of a camel's load; that is an easy measurement." 
Translation by Sahih International from http://quran.com/12 (accessed November 29, 2013). 
35 Yunya, or June, is expanded into Yunyagiyya with the literal translation being ‘those of June,’ in 
reference to the supporters of the June 30, 2013 coup. I keep the term without translation 
throughout the article, as the author defines his term in the text. For the Arabic text, see Abdul 
Rahman Yusuf Website, “al-Yunyagiyya,” http://www.arahman.net/menu-types/1601-2013-11-23-
07-30-12 (Accessed November 20, 2013). 
36 The author inserts the parenthesis and the words within the parenthesis. I insert any additional 
words in brackets to smoothen the translation. 
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the Islamists. For the sake of that [excluding Islamists], they [al-Yunyagiyya] 
commit the same mistakes committed by al-Ikhwan when the [latter] were in 
power. But theirs [Yunyagiyya’s mistakes] are exponentially multiplied [when 
compared to MB mistakes]. 
 
The Yunyagi creature sees no harm in a constitution that sanctions military 
trials for civilians. If you are bold enough and dare tell him [the Yunyagi] that 
the Minister of Defense-related [constitutional] article makes the Yunyagi 
constitution hundred times worse than the 2012 Constitution [of the MB], you 
will hear justifications from him that are worse than those given by al-Ikhwan 
[when defending] their constitution. If you insist on objecting, you will be 
deemed, in his opinion, a traitor or a member of sleeper cells.  
 
Most of them are breed of humans that never said ‘no’ in their whole lives 
until the advent of the January Revolution. They are now depriving the people 
of all the gains of the January Revolution. Most of these people have no 
history [they are unknowns], and most of them were close to centers of power, 
whether corrupt or [supposed] father-like authorities. 
 
Most of these Yunyagiyya deeply hate the January Revolution. It is the 
revolution that called for the return of rights to its rightful owners: the poor 
people. Most of these Yunyagiyya are rich and accustomed to wealth and 
luxury. They do not mind the death of thousands for the sake of bringing back 
their opulent lifestyle, their joyous nights, and the profits [they gain during 
their] daytime [activities].  
 
They do not care for democracy or freedoms or human rights. Life, freedom, 
and social equality are not important to them. To the majority of them, Egypt 
is merely an investment fund containing stocks, bonds, and real estate. [To 
them,] Egypt is not a homeland (watan) worth dying for. 
 
The Yunyagiyya accuse their opponents with two matters: first, belonging to 
al-Ikhwan (or the sleeper cells that serve them [al-Ikhwan]); second, being 
disconnected from reality. Ironically, both of these accusations apply to al-
Yunyagiyya. Through their [Yunyagiyya’s] stupidity, they are proving that the 
MB could not have done any better than what they already did [when in 
power].  Their [Yunyagiyya’s] racist constitution is a great testimony to that.37 
Therefore, their actions serve al-Ikhwan! Regarding the second accusation, [it 
                                                             
37 Given the striking parallels between both constitutions in their curtailment of freedoms, the 
author notes that the military regime’s actions validate MB’s actions when the latter were in 
power. 
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is they who are out of touch with reality] because they do not feel the 
diminishing popularity of the coup, and they do not sense the catastrophe of 
Egypt’s international isolation and the gravity awaiting Egyptian officials 
abroad.   
 
I protested on June 30. I called people to protest (al-nuzul). I do not regret that 
at all. I used my constitutional right in objecting to a president who lost, in my 
opinion, his legitimacy. But I am not one of the arrogant Yunyagiyya who 
looks down on people and is detached from reality. 
 
I protested because I love Egypt and not because I hate al-Ikhwan. 
 
I am not one of those who eat smoked salmon [translated from French] or 
kabob in three-hour protests where people are having fun watching air show 
parades. 
 
Yunyagiyya creatures abandoned the streets and let the tanks occupy [the 
streets instead]. They ask you to vote favorably for the constitution for the 
sake of stability. They continue watching their [TV] channels that only show 
what they want to see, and they remain isolated from reality. Present events, 
however, will soon prompt their wake-up call.    
 
 
__________________________ 
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